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Abstract
In mobile service partnership (MSP for short),
partners’ opportunism has become a serious question
which obsessed mobile network operators (MNO for
short) and impedes healthy growth of mobile
services
chain.
For
loose-coupled
interorganizational
cooperation
partnership,
the
implementation of formal control is often faced with
many
challenges.
Meanwhile,
mobile
communication service industry is one of highestlevel IT/IS equipped sector, how IT/IS affects
control mechanism in MSP is the main objective of
this study.
Drawing from a typical case study, we identify
what characteristics of MSP are more vulnerable to
inclination of opportunism. On the other hand, we
report the significant role that interorganizational
system (IOS)-enabled process control played in
curbing opportunism in MSP from this case. Lastly,
we conclude some managerial implication of our
study.
Keywords: IOS, mobile service platform, control,
partnership

Introduction
Telecommunications is one of the most turbulent
industries in today's economy. Among this industry,
the fast growth of mobile value-added service has
acquired high attention and was predicted as the
most potential business in incoming “3G” era.
In the mobile service sector, MNOs and service
providers/content providers (hereafter we all use SPs
to refer to both two unless otherwise specified)
formed a unique cooperative relationship. [1]
identified relationship between MNO and its partners
as a virtual and global one which enacted through an
inter-organizational information system (IIS). [2]
called this relationship “strategic community”,
specifically, partnership between mobile operator
and SPs as “Portal community”. As the former focus
on communication medium and the latter
emphasized strategic attribute of this partnering, this
relationship is supposed to be learned from different
angles.
In line with prior literatures which studied
telecom partnership, we think, MNO and SPs have
established a cooperative strategic alliance

partnership but with its distinguishing feature. Both
of two parties focused on their own specialty,
therefore joint surplus can be created only through
melting by complementary skills, routines and
capabilities of specialized partners [3]. Using Das’s
analogue that opportunistic behaviors by partners are
like “thorns on the stems of roses” [4], alliance
solely pursuing fast growth was easily exposed to the
hidden “thorns”. Opportunistic behavior of one or
more partners to an alliance is often suggested as a
primary cause for the failure of an alliance to achieve
the goals and purposes of the partners [5].
Control in alliances is generally viewed as a
process of regulation and monitoring for the
achievement of desired alliance goal [6]. In MSP,
control is implemented by controller (operator) to
influence controllee (service providing partners)
through a variety of governing actions. The main
purpose of control is reduction of goal incongruence
and interest divergence among organizational
members. Although control can be costly and
challenging, it is often presumed necessary to curb
opportunism [7].
We focus on formal control in alliance. There
are two main modes of formal control: 1) Outcome
control, which refers to the prespecification by the
controller of desired controllee outputs and the
associated evaluation criteria; 2) process (or
behavior) control, which refers to prescribing the
methods and procedures that the controllee should
follow [8]. The two forms of control play different
part in curbing opportunism. Outcome control,
similar to market mechanism, can effectively avoid
“free-ride”
behavior
of
alliance
partners;
comparatively, process control by regulating the
conduct of partners to prevent major surprise may
effectively reduce opportunism in a more direct way.
Process control increases the ability to detect
opportunism, and accordingly make rewards and
sanctions to the partner's behavior more
appropriately [9]. Moreover, from a behavioral
perspective, the monitoring process itself may place
uncomfortable social pressure on a party and thereby
increase compliance [10].
As the new form of internet-based fraud
emerging, some academic interest has transferred to
more advanced IOS controls, such as EDI controls
[11]. However, existing literatures on IOS and
organizational control are limited, most of them
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focus on EDI [12][13], and Organizational context,
technology factors, task characteristics and relational
factors are suggested to influence EDI control.
Although the purpose of IOS is to enhance
cooperation and control, some practical works claim
IOS often merely play a part in monitoring [14].
As there are few studies concerning how IOS is
used to control over partners’ opportunistic
behaviors, and IOS served in mobile service sector
usually has surpass the scope of “information links”
or “electronic market”[15]. So the study in this filed
still needs more specific evidence and understanding.
In this study, we want to explore these
questions: How does focal firm govern partners’
opportunistic behavior effectively? As a typical
virtual partnering relationship, we also want to know
what role that IOS played in alliance control, and
further more in curbing opportunism in MSP.
For seeking evidence to answer the questions
we interested, a specific case is leveraged to find
answers.
Firstly,
we
extensively
collect
documentation and report material about China
Mobile and its value-added service chain. An
interview to several experts, including three
managers in China Mobile and two managers in
main SP to verify data we used, meanwhile, their
insights on the above research questions have been
organized to develop our proposition.
The Rest sections outline our analyses and
results; and discuss the implications of the study.
Lastly, we conclude some managerial implication of
our study, and index the limitations of our study,
suggest directions for further research.

Case study
China Mobile Communications Corporation (“China
Mobile” for short) is the world’s largest mobile
telecom operator in terms of network scale and
subscriber base. By 2008, the number of subscribers
has reached 400 million.
China Mobile and SPs cooperated in the open
and mutual beneficial basis mainly through
“Monternet” business model which launched by
China Mobile in 2000. From initial mainly focusing
on SMS-based value added services, the
“Monternet” business has become synthesized
mobile services including various types of wireless
data services and voice value-added business.
In China Mobile and value-added service
providers partnering development process, there has
several distinctive key stages:
Prior to August 2004, the value-added business
was in its infancy. China Mobile attracted partner to
its “open value chain” without serious selection just
running for high speed. The qualification of SPs is
uneven. Some SPs adopted deceitful behaviors to
pursue high profit. Since lack of corresponding
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regulations and sanctions, their misconduct didn’t
accept enough punishments. Meantime, although
high profit stimulate fast growth of value-added
services, the misconducts of SPs also affect interests
of subscribers seriously and lower their confidence
to mobile value-added services. The whole services
chain was affected consequently.
Facing this case, both the MNOs and
government regulator step up efforts on the
regulating and managing of SPs from 2004. At the
same time, China Mobile also strengthened the
supervision of SPs and issued some regulations.
In the end of 2004, China Mobile constructed a
data service management platform (DSMP) system
named MISC (mobile information system center,
more detailed introduction and process reengineering
see Appendix). The management of contracted SPs
was transferred in this powerful platform in
succession.
Meantime, China Mobile prescribed a series of
new methods to implement control. In the starting of
cooperation, the outcome control implemented by
China Mobile only focuses on partners’ business
performance. When recognized that opportunism has
damaged the whole alliance’ interests and reputation,
China Mobile began to evaluated partners’
performances based on both business performance
and credit.
From October 2005, China Mobile introduced
credit score approach to manage SPs in Monternet,
which is based on credit assessment of SPs
negatively to their irregularity. The credit score
approach mainly measures SPs’ trustworthiness,
business and service quality, not including operating
income. The indicators of credit score management
have three dimensions including: SPs’ violation,
customer complaints, and the fulfillment of contract.
The low-level credit SPs will subject to punishment
from business suspension until the termination of
operation. The high-level credit SPs have
qualification to participate China Mobile‘s “leveled
management” in which SPs will obtain different
resource support from China Mobile according to
their business performances.
Since there methods were adopted, the
opportunistic behaviors of partners were held up
effectively. For instance, according to the public
financial reports of listed SPs like Linktone
(NASDAQ: LTON), Kongzhong (NASDAQ:
KONG), they all attribute d revenues decline during
2004 and 2005 to application of MISC platform as
the main affecting factor coincidentally. This also
proved MISC platform played a role in rectifying
misconducts of SPs.

Analysis and discussion
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This case reveals some beneficial implications, and
we discuss our finding as follows.
IOS-enabled process control
The case studies revealed that one of the most
important enablers of efficient process control is that
an appropriate deployment and implementation of
interorganizational information system (IOS) which
can effectively reduce partners’ misconducts and
thereby decrease the threat of opportunism.
Some key value-added service processes was
transformed after adoption of MISC, and the
transformation effectively curb SPs’ opportunistic
behaviors including modify business logic, enforcing
subscription, hostile mass message sending et al.
The IOS-enable process control plays a role in
curbing opportunism from following aspects:
1) Facilitate automatic monitoring. Employing
IOS, the content delivered by SPs towards end users
can be monitored automatically, non-compliance and
ill messages will be blocked accordingly, thereby
reduce SPs’ fraudulent behaviors.
Automation by IOS helps to reduce process
variance, thereby effectively reduce human
intervention. e.g. IT always acts as an automatic tool
of process implementing, which makes controllees’
act in accordance with prespecification.
2) Automate key business process. The IOS
replaces human to achieve certain key processes,
facilitates information and data flow between MNO,
service providers and end users without human
intervention.
3) Synchronize business process. IOS helps to
increase process synchronicity which can effectively
reduce human intervention. Employing IOS, many
processes of previous independent business units can
be synchronized with other business process to
assure data reliability and reduce the possibility that
partners will change business process logic privately.
What’s more, synchronization makes sure that
master data is harmonized and homogenized.
4) Standardize business processes and increase
business
transparency.
Through
adding
authentication of subscription and request, the IOS
can effectively prevent SPs from leveraging entry
traps to mislead end users.
IOS-facilitated outcome control
The influence taken by IOS on outcome control may
not as obvious as on process control. However,
Deployment and implementation of advanced IOS
also benefit to outcome control by facilitating
accurate measuring partners’ business performances.
As [16] stated “without precise specification of
the expected outcomes, outcome controls are
subjective and ineffective”. The extensive use of
IT/IS facilitates the efficient gathering of vast

amounts of data, thereby forming more accurate
measurement of partners’ output. Moreover, IOS is
likely to create a relatively advantage for
institutional over contractual governance mechanism
[17], and controller can render more contingent
incentive and outcome control over controllees.
In effect, for purpose of curbing opportunism
or strengthening partner relationship management
(PRM), more comprehensive and restrictive partner
evaluation is needed and depends on more
information gathered.
Employed by IOS, focal firm is facilitated to
measure partners’ output from many more
appropriate aspects, thereby adopt corresponding
incentives and sanctions based on more contingent
situation. For example, China Mobile can implement
“Leveled management” towards SPs based on more
comprehensive evaluation from both business
performances and credit scores.
Prerequisites for IOS-enabled control
This case also highlight that only higher levels of
external integration that go beyond simple
procurement or communication systems allow focal
firms to enhance formal control efficiency. That
means some important conditions are supposed to be
fulfilled to implement this IOS-enabled control.
Firstly, IOS-enabled control demand focal firm
have mature IT-capacity (e.g. China Mobile held
majority stake in platform provider — ASPire
Technologies to strengthen this capacity). Most of
the businesses are carried on based on ITinfrastructure, and thereby business intelligence (BI)
can be widely supported. From the above analysis,
whatever process control or PRM can’t be achieved
without BI derived from mature IT-capacity.
Secondly,
a
reciprocal
interdependent
cooperation is demanded between focal firm and its
partners. In effect, the resource complementarity of
MNO and SPs means that they need to share mutual
resources, exchange reciprocity, which are also
essential enablers in implementing IOS.
Thirdly, IT strategy should be integrated with
partnering strategy with complementary incentive
and sanction institution rather than a tool facilitating
business process automatically or communication. In
this case, whether a series of management
approaches issued by China Mobile go behind or
beyond IT construction, they can’t work effectively.
IT provides MNO with flexible ability to deal with
contingency, further, the better use this ability is
another art.

Conclusion
In this study, we raise the question of partners’
opportunism and its curbing mechanism in emerging
MSP. From perspectives of organizational control
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and IOS, we propose our central argument that an
IOS-enabled process control can effectively curb
opportunism, which is illustrated by using a typical
case study. In our context, we implied that the IOSenabled process control is linked with focal firm’s
mature IT capacity. In addition, the focal firm
incorporated technology strategy and partnering
strategy also contribute to the success of IOSenabled process control.
We also discussed the prerequisites for efficient
implementation of IOS-enabled control, not merely
related to task characteristic, industrial context, the
complementarity between institutional arrangement
and IOS practices is highlighted as well.
Several limitations still exist in this work.
Firstly, our evidence rest on qualitative analysis of a
typical case, we still need more quantitative data to
support our results. Secondly, we focus our interest
on IOS’s impact on formal control, but how IOS use
affect informal control, like some relational
governance mechanism, is still needed to be
inspected in MSP further.
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MISC is an integrated data services platform for
operators to quickly activate a variety of data
services and a powerful resource scheduling
platform, providing functions such as customer
management, order management and service
provider
management
of mobile data services. It connects the network and
business operations support system (customer
service systems, operating systems, billing systems).
It provide SPs with various telecommunications
resources (such as Short Message Service Center,
users’ information resources, voice system, fax
system, etc.), functional resources (such as single
point of authentication, billing, roaming control,
personalization, etc.) and various public resources
engine (such as text-to-speech, location, voice
interaction, push information, etc.). MISC plays a
"bridge" role in linking mobile operators and content
providers, enables operators to launch a new
business fastest and simpler; make content providers
focus on content and applications development
without considering more technical details about
networks, thereby new value-added business can be
provided more cheaply and quickly. Mobile users
can access these businesses by using any terminal
(WAP phone, PDA, PC, ordinary telephones, fax
machines, etc.) with any method including SMS,
WAP, WEB, voice/fax through "Monternet" portal.

Table1 key processes reengineered before and after adoption of MISC
Item
Subscription records
storage

After Upgrade
Subscription records are only stored by
SP.

Subscription status
delivery

Notification of subscription is delivered
by SP own
Services canceling process is charged by
SP own
SP launched monthly charges request
independently
No authentication of Subscription and
request, all the messages were delivered
to SP by gateway
Subscription records were only stored by
SP, no synchronization exist

Subscription canceling
Monthly charges
Authentication of
Subscription and
request
Synchronization
of
subscription records
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